ENERGY
EFFICIENCY BUILDING CODES AND CONNECTICUT– AN UNSURPRISING WHIMPER OF A BANG
FOR OUR BUCK
A carefully constructed
regulation can accomplish all kinds of anticompetitive goals ( ), while giving
the citizenry the impression that the only goal is to serve the public
interest.
Bruce Yandle (1983)
Professor
Bishwa Koirala came to campus this past week. He gave a talk based on his
recent research. His paper addressed a simple question – and the resulting
answer proved surprising - perhaps because it is counterintuitive. Professor
Koirala (and coauthors) looked to see if the mandated energy-efficiency regulations
into existing building code regulations was worthwhile.1 He examined massive amounts
of data – using the most recent energy-efficient building codes (IECC 2003
through IECC 2006) for the US at large – and for Connecticut as well.
Increased
regulatory requirements designed to enhance the efficient use of energy in our
homes would assuredly increase the front-end costs of construction. The costs
would be passed along resulting in higher housing and building prices and
higher rents. But not to worry: we were told that we would get our money back
because our energy bill would be lower as a result of the enhanced building
efficiency and thus the added cost would be fully offset or recovered. But was
this true back then when we were mulling it over? Have the higher cost of
regulations delivered the promised bang for the buck? This last question is the
one posed by Professor Koirala. And the answer regrettably, is no, - not even
close.
Surprisingly,
the adoption of these building codes – back then - were not based on empirical
work, nor on actual data. According to Koirala, government studies by the
Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and various private
sector studies (including one by McKinsey and Company) concluded that energy
regulations were desirable because the increased cost of requiring energy
efficiency building codes would be fully offset by reductions in household
monthly energy expenditures. But all these studies were based on theoretical
assumptions - not on actual, hard data.
Koirala
and co-authors find that energy efficiency regulations in building codes, once
capitalized, are estimated to increase housing rents by 23.35 percent. The
offset in reduced monthly energy expenditures only amounts to 6.47 percent. In
dollar terms – the codes cost $163.19 per month and only save us $7.71. That’s
for the entire US! As expected, it varies by region (and energy type and rent
gradient.) I asked Professor Koirala to calculate the comparable numbers for
Connecticut – which are not in the original paper. He kindly complied. In
Connecticut, having the energy efficiency regulations embedded into building
codes is costing us $164.07 per month. And they save us all of $8.08. Now about
that (covered) bridge...
But
notwithstanding the insightfulness of Professor Koirala's results - as is the
case in these studies – it begs the question: why do we do this to ourselves?
As individuals we would never purchase a car for $10,000 whose blue book value
is $5,000. So why do we do we find ourselves on the
wrong side of this energy cost trade-off thing - or, more accurately, stand by
while Hartford and Washington do it to us?
Koirala
does not go into the why – but the answer is not altogether that perplexing.
The "Bootleggers and Baptists" metaphor that Professor Bruce Yandle
used in his now classic paper of the same name helps understand the reason why.2 He has
explained the metaphor: "durable social regulation evolves when it is
demanded by both of two distinctly different groups: 'Baptists' point to the
moral high ground and give vital and vocal endorsements of laudable public
benefits promised by a desired regulation."3 In our case - in Connecticut, we have
the green, sustainability and global-warming choirs and cheerleaders taking the
moral high ground where everything is justified - and even vaguely critical
voices pummeled into submission - in the name of abating or reducing global
warming - cost-benefits be damned.
To
continue: “the ‘Bootleggers’ expected to profit from the very regulatory
restrictions and requirements desired by the Baptists (…) and so eagerly
greased the political machinery with some of their expected proceeds.” Who
could our Connecticut Bootleggers be? The manufacturers of bulbs, electrical
equipment, windows, doors, heating and cooling systems and sundry home
construction materials folks and so on - those who stand to benefit from the
additional requirements embedded in the code of products that only they can
provide and the more expensive components only a few make. Eliminating or
handicapping rivals is always good for the bottom line.
Professor
Yandle has wryly noted that regulatory reform can hardly be gained easily
because it is the result of a costly political exchange. Alas, he also spoke of
a special place for the creative application of economic logic – a place where
individuals like Professor Koirala, who gain special satisfaction from calling
attention to the ways in which we can improve economic efficiency, can do so. We’d
like to think UNH’s Department of Economics is such a place. People and their ideas make a difference.
arodriguez@newhaven.edu
February
09, 2014
1 Koirala,
Bishwa S., Alok K. Bohara, and Robert P. Berrens, “Estimating the Net Implicit
Price of Energy Efficient Building Codes on U.S. Households,” (2014). Please email me at arodriguez@newhaven.edu
if you would like a copy of the paper.